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Abstract—In this paper we identify the requirements for the
definition of a security framework for distributed access control
in dynamic coalitions of heterogeneous systems. Based on the
elicited requirements, we introduce the POLIPO framework
that combines distributed access control with ontologies to
give a globally understandable semantics to policies, enabling
interoperability among heterogeneous systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the context of the POSEIDON project1 we are devel-
oping a security framework for distributed access control in
a System of Systems (SoS) [1]. The SoS model is suitable
to represent and analyze the Maritime Safety and Security
(MSS) domain which is the focus of POSEIDON. The MSS
domain is characterized by the interaction and collaboration
between autonomous and heterogeneous systems sharing
information, processes, and resources. These collaborations
are not fixed a priori, but can dynamically change over time
as new parties join, leave, or change their responsibilities
and objectives. An example of MSS coalition is the task
force created by the European Union to protect commercial
shipping off the Somali coast against piracy.2
The SoS model eliminates the physical boundaries of
organizations and increases operational flexibility, but affects
interoperability and security of collaborating parties. Sharing
sensitive information with other parties may be required for
the success of the coalition. For example, a commercial ship
having an engine failure off Somali coast can communicate
its position to the EU task force for aid. EU surveillance ves-
sels, however, may employ different communication models
and thus are not able to interpret the message. Moreover,
the message can be intercepted by pirates that can exploit
this emergency situation to attack the ship.
The development of authorization mechanisms for dis-
tributed systems has become a major research challenge.
Trust management (TM) is an approach to this problem in
which access control decisions are based on credentials [2],
[3]. However, TM does not support any control on the data
after their disclosure. Therefore, distributed access control
needs to be complemented with portable policies (i.e., sticky
policies) [4]. Nevertheless, TM and sticky policies do not
provide a solution to the problem of interoperability.
1http://www.esi.nl/poseidon/
2http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1518&lang=en
When heterogeneous systems form coalitions that
transgress the traditional boundaries among organizational,
cultural, and legal units, vocabulary alignment is required
to enable mutual understanding among parties. Ontologies
provide a means for establishing common vocabularies by
providing a precise semantics to concepts and relationships
in a domain. This has spurred researchers to use ontologies
for the specification of security policies [5]. However, the
expressive power of these policies is restricted to the one of
ontology languages. To overcome this limitation, ontologies
have been extended with rules [6], but this extension often
causes ontology reasoning to become undecidable [7].
This paper proposes the POLIPO (Policies & OntoLogies
for Interoperability, Portability, and autOnomy) framework
to address the problem of distributed access control in an
SoS. In particular, we make the following contributions:
• We identify the requirements for the definition of a
security framework for distributed access control in
dynamic coalitions of heterogeneous systems.
• We propose a policy language that combines access
control and trust management for the specification of
security policies in an SoS.
• We enable interoperability between heterogeneous sys-
tems, by applying ontology-based vocabulary alignment
to distributed access control. The attributes certified in
a credential and the actions characterizing a permission
are defined in a shared ontology.
• We combine policy rules with ontologies to improve
the query answering support to the knowledge base.
This makes it possible to exploit the reasoning services
offered by ontologies. However, we do not extend
ontologies with rules to avoid undecidability problems.
In the POLIPO framework, ontologies are used as
remote oracles to infer domain knowledge.
• We discuss an implementation of the framework.
II. REQUIREMENTS
A practical policy framework should support autonomy in
policy specification as well as interoperability among parties
and policy portability. In this section, we clarify and discuss
the requirements that have driven the design of POLIPO.
Requirement 1 (Autonomy): Every party shall be able to
design and express its policy autonomously.
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(1) SeniorOfficer v Officer
JuniorOfficer v Officer
(2) TemporaryOfficer v SeniorOfficer
TemporaryOfficer v JuniorOfficer
(3) JuniorOfficer v ¬ SeniorOfficer
(4) StarNavy v AlliedNavy
Figure 1. Sample POSEIDON Ontology
This means that every party shall be able to specify its
policies regardless of which parties have already joined the
coalition. While this requirement may seem obvious and
trivial to implement, we state it explicitly because it has
implications that can easily conflict with other requirements.
Requirement 2 (Interoperability): Parties shall be able to
interact with each other unambiguously.
As security policies have to be understood by all parties,
the problem of semantic interoperability emerges. To tackle
this problem, we turn to the established practice of ontolo-
gies. An ontology is a formal representation of a domain
in terms of concepts and relationships, each with a precise
semantics.
Some ontologies support non-monotonic constraints (e.g.,
disjointness of concepts). This implies that extending an on-
tology can introduce inconsistencies. Therefore, when using
a single shared ontology as common vocabulary, we cannot
simply allow parties to it by adding their own local concepts
and constraints, because this would introduce limitations that
are based on the order in which the parties join the coalition.
Example 1: Take the ontology in part 1 of Fig. 1 and
suppose two parties want to join the coalition and add their
constraints to this ontology. One party wants to add part 2
while the other party wants to add part 3. Whatever party
joins the coalition first will be able to make its adaptations
without making the ontology inconsistent. But thereafter,
extending the ontology for the other party would be illegal.
The example above shows that demanding a shared
ontology to be consistent would conflict with autonomy.
For this reason, we allow local extensions to the shared
ontology. When a party joins the coalition, it imports the
POSEIDON ontology into its local ontology, and possibly
reuses and extends some global concepts. Every party should
keep its local ontology consistent. However, the extensions
made locally to the imported ontology remain inside the
ontology of a certain party and, therefore, cannot affect the
consistency of the ontologies of other parties.
Requirement 3 (Portability): Remote evaluation of poli-
cies shall preserve the interpretation of the policy owner.
Policies can be transferred to other parties, with the
intention of restricting the usage and redistribution of data.
Typically, sticky policies are attached to the data they
protect, following them from system to system, and are
evaluated and enforced remotely at the side of a trusted data
recipient. When an access request is processed remotely,
the data owner wants to be sure that the sticky policy is
evaluated according to his own interpretation. Thereby, the
data owner has to be careful when designing a policy, to
preclude illegitimate flows of information. In this setting,
the use of credentials allows the data owner to maintain
more control over remote access to data.
Example 2: The Green Star Navy allows senior officers
of allied navies to access some sensitive information, where
allied navies include Star navies according to the POSEI-
DON ontology (part 4 of Fig. 1). Senior officers of the
Blue Star Navy are thus allowed to access the information.
However, the Blue Star Navy also includes the Grey Cross
Navy among its allies in its local ontology. If the policy is
evaluated locally within the Blue Star Navy, senior officers
of the Grey Cross Navy are granted permission to access the
information, against the intention of the Green Star Navy
which does not have the Grey Cross Navy among its allies.
To prevent this disclosure of information, the Green Star
Navy can specify that only senior officers of navies having
an ‘AlliedNavy’ credential signed by the Green Star Navy
itself are entitled to access the information.
Data recipients need to avail of all necessary information
to evaluate a policy correctly. Therefore, the data owner must
make sure that sticky policies are self-contained as far as
their evaluation is concerned.
III. THE POLIPO FRAMEWORK
In this section we present POLIPO (Policies & On-
toLogies for Interoperability, Portability, and autOnomy), a
security framework that combines distributed access control
with ontologies to enable interoperability, portability, and
autonomy in dynamic coalitions of heterogeneous systems.
In particular, we introduce a logic-, ontology-based language
for the specification of distributed access control policies.
POLIPO policies are specified using four constructs:
• ontology atoms: are used to query the knowledge base
represented by ontologies. Each concept in an ontology
is identified by a conceptURI . conceptURI (a) holds
if a is an instance of conceptURI . Each relationship
in an ontology is identified by a relationshipURI .
relationshipURI (a1, a2) holds if instance a1 is re-
lated to instance a2 via relationshipURI . Exam-
ples of ontology atoms are given in part 1 of
Fig. 2: psd :SeniorOfficer is a conceptURI and
psd :worksFor is a relationshipURI . These atoms
check whether ‘John’ is a senior officer and if he works
for the Green Star Navy (GS is the unique identifier of
the Green Star Navy) according to the definitions given
in the POSEIDON ontology. Consistently with the
XML (and OWL) convention, we use prefixes followed
by symbol “:” to substitute base URIs (e.g., psd: stands
for www.example.net/poseidon/PSD-Ontology/ ).
• credential atoms: represent digitally signed statements
made by an issuer about an attribute of a subject. A
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(1) psd :SeniorOfficer(‘John’)
psd :worksFor(‘John’, ‘GS ’)
(2) cred(‘BS ’, ‘psd :SeniorOfficer ’, ‘John’,
[[(‘psd :ValidUntil’, “31/12/2009”)],
[(‘psd :WorksFor ’, ‘GS ’)]])
(3) perm(‘psd :read’, ‘John’, ‘File’)
(4) X = Y + 3
X ≥ Y
(5) aboutSurveillance(‘File’)
Figure 2. Examples of POLIPO Atoms
credential atom has the form:
cred(issuer , att , subject , [[c1, . . . , cn], [a1, . . . , an]])
where issuer is the unique name of the entity sign-
ing the credential; att is a conceptURI specify-
ing the attribute for which the credential is issued;
subject is the unique name of the entity to whom
the credential refers; [c1, . . . , cn] and [a1, . . . , an] are
lists of optional properties. Each ci (respectively ai)
is a pair (property , value), where property is a
relationshipURI related to the the concept credential3
(resp. to att), and value bounds the range of the
relationship. Part 2 of Fig. 2 shows a credential issued
by the Blue Star Navy (BS ) and certifying the fact that
‘John’ is a senior officer of the Green Star Navy. The
credential has validity period as an optional property.
• authorization atoms: denote the permission of a subject
to perform an action on an object. They have form:
perm(action, subject , object)
where action is a relationshipURI specifying the
action that subject is allowed to perform on object ;
subject is the unique name of the entity to whom the
permission is granted; object represents the target of
the permission. In the authorization atom in Fig. 2 part
3, ‘John’ is given the permission to read ‘File’.
• constraints: are specified using Constraints Logic Pro-
gramming (CLP) [8] constraints (e.g., =, >, <, etc.) or
user-defined predicates (resp. parts 4 and 5 in Fig. 2).
We formalize POLIPO policies in the logic programming
paradigm. POLIPO rules are Horn clauses of the form h←
b1, . . . , bn, where h, called head, is an atom, and b1, . . . , bn,
called body, are literals (i.e., positive or negative atoms) with
n ≥ 0. Negation is treated as negation-as-failure (denoted
by not): if there is no evidence that an atom is true, it is
considered to be false. We also assume that each variable
occurring in the head of a rule, in a negative literal, as issuer
of a credential atom, or in a CLP constraint also occurs in
at least one positive literal in the body of the same rule.
We distinguish three types of rules: credential release
rules, authorization rules, and predicate definition rules.
3cred and perm are formally defined in the POSEIDON ontology.
Credential Release Rule
cred(‘BS ’, ‘psd :SeniorOfficer ’, X, [])← psd :SeniorOfficer(X)
Authorization Rule
perm(‘psd :read’, X, Y )← aboutSurveillance(Y ),
cred(‘BS ’, ‘psd :SeniorOfficer ’, X, [])
Predicate Definition Rule
aboutSurveillance(X)← bs:aboutMission(X, ‘Surveillance’),
bs:sensitivityLevel(X,Y ), Y < 3
Figure 3. Examples of POLIPO Rules
Definition 1 (Credential Release Rule): A credential re-
lease rule is a Horn clause where the head is a credential
atom and the body can contain positive credential and
ontology atoms, and constraints.
Example 3: The first rule in Fig. 3 states that the Blue
Star Navy releases a psd :SeniorOfficer credential to entities
defined as senior officers in the POSEIDON ontology.
It is worth noting the difference in the use of
psd :SeniorOfficer . When it occurs as the predicate name
in the ontology atom, it refers to the knowledge base of the
Blue Star Navy. When it occurs in the credential atom, it is
the attribute of the subject certified by the navy.
Definition 2 (Authorization Rule): An authorization rule
is a Horn clause where the head is an authorization atom
and the body can contain positive credential, authorization,
and ontology atoms, constraints, and negative ontology and
user-defined atoms.
Example 4: The second rule in Fig. 3 states that subject
X is authorized to read object Y if Y is about surveillance
and X provides a credential issued by the Blue Star Navy
stating that he is a senior officer.
We only allow negation-as-failure of ontology and user-
defined atoms in the body of authorization rules for two
reasons. First, we restrict non-monotonicity to predicates in
the knowledge base. This guarantees that POLIPO policies
are stratified logic programs, ensuring efficiency and un-
ambiguity. Second, there is a semantic difference between
credential release rules and authorization rules. Authoriza-
tion rules are evaluated to determine whether a permission
should be granted or not at a certain instant; changes in the
truth value of an atom in the body only affect future access
decision, without impacting past decisions. On the contrary,
once a credential is issued, it is valid for a period of time.
Definition 3 (Predicate Definition Rule): A predicate
definition rule is a Horn clause where the head is a user-
defined atom and the body can contain positive ontology
atoms and constraints.
Example 5: The third rule in Fig. 3 defines the user-
defined predicate aboutSurveillance. An object is about
surveillance if it concerns mission ‘Surveillance’ and has
sensitivity level less than 3 according to the Blue Star Navy.
We have limited the occurrence of ontology atoms to
the body of POLIPO rules. This is to keep the policy
and ontology reasoning separated. Indeed, by allowing a
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free interaction of ontologies with rules (i.e., using rules to
modify the semantics of ontologies) the ontology reasoning
may become undecidable [7].
POLIPO policies consist of sets of POLIPO rules. In
particular, we distinguish two types of policies: credential
release policies and authorization policies.
Definition 4 (Credential Release Policy): A credential
release policy is a set of credential release rules.
Definition 5 (Authorization Policy): An authorization
policy is a set of authorization rules.
We have implemented a prototype of the policy decision
engine in SWI-Prolog. The main reason for using SWI-
Prolog is that it provides an interface with ontologies,
through the Semantic Web Library. This library consists
of packages for reading, querying and storing RDF doc-
uments, and hence ontologies (every OWL ontology can
be represented as RDF triples). For example, the ontology
atom psd :SeniorOfficer(‘John’) can be expressed using the
built-in predicate rdf(John,rdf:type,SeniorOfficer), where rdf:
is the prefix of the URI where relationship type is defined.
The downside of this implementation choice is that SWI-
Prolog does not automatically deal with loops. A solution
for handling recursive credentials will be the subject of a
whole paper devoted to the algorithms of POLIPO.
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In recent years, a lot of effort has been invested in the
specification of access control policies for distributed sys-
tems. Li et al. [3] introduce the trust management framework
RT which addresses vocabulary alignment using Application
Domain Specification Documents (ADSDs). Similarly to
RT, TuLiP [2] uses XML namespaces to avoid name con-
flicts and facilitate the definition of a common vocabulary.
However, these approaches are purely syntactical and do
not provide the semantics, expressiveness and reasoning
facilities provided by ontologies.
In the attempt to enhance the Semantic Web with security
policies, ontologies have been combined with rules [9].
However, integrating ontologies and rules may cause DL
reasoning to become undecidable [6]. This limitation has
spurred researchers to investigate syntactic restrictions that
keep DL with rules decidable [7]. Our approach relates well
to [10] which imports in logic programs the knowledge
contained in ontologies, without fully integrating the two
frameworks. The difference lies in the fact that we do not
allow the flow of information from the logic program to the
ontology. Eiter et al. use the knowledge inferred by rules
to temporarily feed the ontology for further reasoning. This,
however, can introduce inconsistencies in the ontology.
This paper has discussed the requirements for the defini-
tion of a security framework for distributed access control in
the context of the POSEIDON project. Based on the elicited
requirements, we have proposed POLIPO, a framework that
combines access control, trust management and ontologies to
enable interoperability, portability, and autonomy in dynamic
coalition of heterogeneous systems. Due to the lack of space,
we refer to [11] for a discussion on portable policies.
The work is still in progress to increase the flexibility
and expressive power of the language. We are investigating
a method to allow parties to specify policies using local
vocabulary in such a way that policies can be still understood
and evaluated correctly by other parties.
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